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Abstract 
 
This thesis evaluates the policy-induced changes from Germany’s 2007 
Parental Leave Policy reforms on new mothers’ return-to-work intentions 
after childbirth. In the hopes of incentivizing female labor force 
participation and encouraging fertility, German policymakers radically 
restructured the parental leave benefit system. The updated policy grants 
the stay-at-home parent 67% of net earnings for twelve months 
immediately following birth. To empirically test the effects on new 
mother’s employment behavior, this study utilizes the 2003 and 2009 
waves of the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (GSOEP) in 
conducting a binomial probit regression analysis of her return-to-work 
likelihoods and expected speed of return. The results suggest that 
Germany’s 2007 Parental Leave reforms created a positive effect in 
encouraging new mothers’ return to the labor force as well as their 
expected speed of return following childbirth. 
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1 
Introduction 
The increased participation of women in the labor force has proved to be one of 
the most significant changes of the 20th century. When western economies grew, so did 
their gross domestic products (GDP), causing more and more people to flood into the 
labor markets. Most notably, many developed countries witnessed steep spikes in female 
labor force participation rates. For Germany in particular, these trends are surprising. The 
male breadwinner-female housewife model of household production has historically 
characterized Germany’s cultural norms, values, and stereotypical gender roles. Boosts in 
female labor force participation rates have largely impacted a German woman’s ability to 
find fulfillment beyond the private sphere of her home. German society is witness to a 
reversal in its deep-seated cultural expectations. Indeed, the entire face of familial roles 
and values is undergoing transformation. As female workers have steadily infiltrated the 
historically male-dominated labor force, Germany has been forced to meet the changing 
needs of a more diverse workforce. Economically speaking, spikes in German female 
labor force participation rates effectively raised the foregone value of their time spent in 
child-care and household production. According to data from the World Bank, German 
female labor force participation rates rose from 43% in 1990 to 54% in 2013 (World 
Bank Data Center, 2013). Women in the workforce have been rising to the ranks of their 
male counterparts, leveling the playing field. One consequence of these shifts in labor 
force composition is the large reductions in demand for children. More and more women 
have found the opportunity cost of children too high, which explains why Germany has 
record low fertility and maternal employment rates. When it comes to the choice between 
a full-time career or a family, mothers in Germany women seem to choose one or the 
other – as opposed to balancing the two.  
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Between the years 2000 and 2006, the fertility rate in Germany, for those aged 15 
to 49 years old, dropped from 1.38 to 1.33 births per woman (OECD, 2013). During the 
same time frame, labor force participation rates of German women continued to climb. 
Although lower fertility rates are typical of most developed western nations, the German 
case is one example of record low rates. This trend has not been seen in Germany since 
World War II. The German fertility rate has been trailing behind other OECD nations. 
Seen in Table 1 (below), Germany is the only country that has experienced a consistent 
decrease in fertility rates over this seven-year period. Compared to its European 
neighbors, such as France with a rate of 1.98, Germany’s declining rates were 
disconcerting. 
Table 1: Fertility Rates of Women Aged 15 to 49  
Country 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Austria 1.36 1.39 1.38 1.42 1.41 1.41 
Belgium 1.67 1.65 1.67 1.72 1.76 1.8 
Denmark 1.77 1.72 1.76 1.78 1.8 1.85 
France 1.87 1.86 1.87 1.9 1.92 1.98 
Germany 1.38 1.34 1.34 1.36 1.34 1.33 
Sweden 1.55 1.65 1.72 1.75 1.77 1.85 
United Kingdom 1.64 1.64 1.71 1.77 1.79 1.84 
United States 2.06 2.01 2.04 2.05 2.05 2.1 
Source: OECD 2013, "Fertility Rates of Women Aged 15 to 49"  
 
Furthermore, the maternal employment rate in Germany have remained much lower 
compared to other OECD nations. Looking at the year 2002, for instance, the maternal 
employment rate of German mothers with children under three years old was 56%– the 
lowest out of the same group of eight OECD nations. Even the United States, which does 
not have a federally mandated parental leave system, had a higher maternal employment 
rate at the time. The statistics are taken from OECD provided data, and presented below 
in Table 2: 
 3 
Table 2: Maternal Employment Rates by Age of Youngest Child (2002) 
Country Age of Youngest Child 
 
Under 3 3 to 5 6 to 14 
Austria 80.1 70.3 69.8 
Belgium 70.4 67.4 68.6 
Denmark 71.4 77.5 79.1 
France 66.2 63.2 67.5 
Germany 56.0 58.1 64.3 
Sweden 72.9 82.5 77.4 
United Kingdom 57.2 56.9 67 
United States 56.6 60 69.4 
Source: OECD 2006, "Mothers in Paid Employment"  
 
In combination, this declining fertility rate and low maternal employment rate 
pose difficult challenges if Germany wishes to continue as Europe’s leading economic 
power. According to “Population by 2050,” a recently-published study by the German 
Federal Statistics Office, the population in Germany is projected to drop from almost 
82.5 million in 2005 to 69 million by 2050 (Federal Statistics Office of Germany, 2006). 
Furthermore, the same report projects the older population in Germany doubling by 2050, 
while birth rates remaining constant. The total working age population is expected to be 
42 to 44 million in 2030 but only 35 to 39 million in 2050 (Federal Statistics Office of 
Germany, 2006).  Hence, scholars expect a significant decrease in the working age 
population will cause a shift in the working age dependency ratio– i.e. more people 
working to older and older ages with fewer young people to support them. A decrease in 
a nation’s working age population reduces the productive capacity of its economy 
because of the resulting decline in its active labor force.  Why ought these predictions 
raise concern for Germany? A depleted working age population and simultaneous bulge 
in the older age population are not favorable conditions for long-term economic growth, 
and will create internal strains for the country’s economy.  
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 In response to these demographic pressures, German policymakers have sought 
to create a policy that inspires a better balance between work and family life. What does a 
proper work and family life balance look like - and what is it supposed to achieve? 
Individuals who choose to start a family must allocate their time and resources efficiently 
to ensure adequate childcare while avoiding serious income losses. Achievements in child 
development and resulting positive externalities for society (such as an educated youth 
population) should provide enough incentive for governments to invest in family policies. 
Most individuals struggling with the choice to start a family fear the negative 
consequences doing so might have on their progress along their chosen career paths. In 
Germany, the consequences on individual human capital help to explain why rates of 
maternal employment have lagged behind in recent years. It also explains why some 
women, especially those with higher levels of human capital and labor force attachment, 
choose not to have any children at all. Since the latter half of the 1990s, Germany has 
offered parents more flexibility in balancing their career and children; but despite these 
well-established family policies, fertility rates have plummeted, prompting lawmakers to 
consider a new approach. Enacted in 2007, Germany’s Parental Leave Policy Reforms 
marked a paradigm shift in family policy. These reforms significantly increased monetary 
incentives for fertility and “disincentivized” longer interruptions in employment. On the 
whole, the policy attempts to do away with welfare dependence, i.e. recipients relying on 
government support to survive.  Essentially, the 2007 reform’s purposes are to activate 
labor force participation of mothers, encourage fertility, and support young families. 
The structural organization of this paper is twofold. It offers both a quantitative 
and qualitative analysis of the 2007 parental leave policy reform in Germany. In Part I 
consists of my quantitative analysis.  In it, I examine the effectiveness of Germany’s 
2007 Parental Leave reform, particularly on mother’s return-to-work intentions after 
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childbirth. In order to conduct an in depth analysis, I organize two sections as follows. 
Chapter I provides a detailed description of Germany’s institutional background as it 
relates to the 2007 policy reforms. Chapter 2 reviews the existing literature, which 
supports the development of my research. Chapter 3 presents the theoretical evidence 
necessary to conduct my analysis. Chapter 4 establishes the data and methodology used 
to present the empirical analysis. Chapter 4 concludes Part I with a discussion of the 
general findings from my quantitative research. Part II covers the qualitative analysis, 
discussing how Germany’s 2007 parental leave reform resembles neoliberal economic 
theory in practice. Chapter 5 provides a broad overview of neoliberal economic theory in 
order to lay the groundwork for my analysis. I follow up this overview by discussing how 
Germany’s social democracy and welfare state have come under pressure by virtue of 
neoliberalism in Chapter 6. Finally, in Chapter 7, I suggest that the 2007 parental leave 
reform establishes a strong foundation for Germany’s future economically, socially, and 
politically. The paper concludes with a summary of my quantitative findings, which 
support my hypothesis that the reform has a positive impact on mother’s return-to-work 
intentions. It also summarizes how they support my qualitative analysis, which interprets 
the policy from a neoliberal approach. 
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I. Institutional Background 
History of Parental Leave: 
Raising a family while maintaining a career is an ongoing battle faced by the majority of 
adults. The primary goal of a parental leave policy is to alleviate and help parents resolve 
this conflict. Parental leave provides parents with confidence that their job is protected 
while they attend to the care of their newborn children. Germany’s parental leave system 
is a unique case to study as it was developed against the backdrop of war. In the 
aftermath of World War II, Germany faced detrimental population loss. During this 
chaotic time period, the family unit represented a reliable resource for citizens and social 
institution. Out of this grim reality arose keen interests amongst policymakers to rebuild 
Germany’s social system by creating more top-down family policies. Under the direction 
of former chancellor Helmut Kohl, in 1986 the coalition of the German Christian 
Democrats (CDU) and Free Democratic Party (FDP) constructed Germany’s first 
“parental leave” system. The policy originally attempted to help rebuild the German 
population and its economy by incentivizing fertility while also encouraging female 
employment. Leading up to this period in history, the “breadwinner model” characterized 
the typical German family’s approach to household production. For instance, mothers in 
Germany have been entitled to maternity leave and benefits since 1979, seven years 
before men became eligible, under the mother protection law, Mutterschutzgesetz 
(Ondrich, Spiess, Yang, & Wagner, 1995). The original maternity leave policies 
established by law that mothers were prohibited from working until eight weeks passed 
after giving birth. It was not until the creation of “parental leave” policies, in the later part 
of the 1980s, that household production became viewed as a task for either parent. The 
1986 federal child-rearing benefit, Bundeserziehungsgeldgesetz, reformed the German 
system to be gender neutral and available for both parents. Following its enactment, there 
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was a movement away from the “breadwinner model” towards a “dual-earner model.” 
The intent of these policies was to provide both parents with flexible working 
arrangements. From the 1970s to 1990s, Germany’s labor force witnessed an increase in 
the participation rate of women with young children–growing from 32.4% in 1985 to 
45.1% in 1991 (Ondrich et al., 1995). The range of privileges parents could access was 
expanded even more following the initial 1986 policy. Since 1992, parents have enjoyed 
job-protected-leave until the child’s third birthday. German parents can stay at home 
anytime during the first three years of their child’s life without losing their previous job. 
Moreover, after the 2001 reforms, the parent staying at home was given the option to take 
two years (24 months) of paid leave.  
The 2001 parental leave policy instituted new incentives, at the time, for parents. 
Policymakers from both ends of the political spectrum were beginning to agree that 
family policies are important tools to ensure both a strong future labor force and 
economic growth. During the 1990s, Germany’s parental leave system was structured as 
a cash benefit transfer program, which was widely criticized as being ineffective. After 
the election, in 1998, of Chancellor Gerhard Schröder’s Social Democratic Party, in 
1998, Germany’s social welfare system. shifted The 2001 policy instituted a means-tested 
benefit transfer system. A means-tested system essentially determines eligibility for 
government assistance.  Hence, if individuals or families have the means to support 
themselves, i.e. income, then government assistance is denied. Moreover, in cases of 
public assistance, the parent on leave was given two choices in benefits. The first option 
provided €450 per month for the first twelve months immediately following childbirth; 
the second option totaled €300 in benefits per month for the first twenty-four months 
following childbirth. As mentioned, the maternity benefit was means-tested; if the 
parents’ joint income exceeded a certain income ceiling the benefit was not granted. In 
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the first six months of the child’s life, two-parent households with an annual income less 
than or equal to €30,000 were eligible for assistance. For single parent households, the 
income ceiling was capped at €23,000. Six months after the birth, these caps decreased 
to €16,500 and €13,500 respectively.  
Before the 2001 policy reform, a parent on leave was only allowed to work up to 
a total of nineteen hours a week while receiving the benefit. Following the new law’s 
enactment, this work restriction was extended to allow thirty hours of work per week. 
What’s more, the 2001 reforms allowed both parents to utilize the parental leave time 
simultaneously. Ultimately, however, lawmakers viewed the long duration of benefit 
eligibility as a deterrent for female labor force participation following childbirth, since 
twenty-four months of paid parental leave is conducive to longer labor market 
interruptions. Subsequently, in 2002, Germany’s maternal employment rate for mothers 
with children under three years was 56%, which is quite low compared to Germany’s 
European neighbors. These negative trends in the employment rates of mothers with 
young children persisted, however, which proved the 2001 policy was relatively 
ineffective in encouraging labor force participation. Policy makers had no choice but to 
pursue yet another family policy scheme. For the first time in two decades, the duration 
of benefit eligibility was shortened and the monetary benefit amount was significantly 
increased.  
 
2007 Policy Reforms: 
The 2007 parental leave policy reforms were implemented in the face of several 
demographic changes in Germany. In conjunction with shortages of skilled labor, 
Germany witnessed changes in social perceptions regarding maternal employment. 
Elected in 2005, and still in power today, Chancellor Angela Merkel (Christian 
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Democratic Union) led efforts to reign in previous expansions of Germany’s welfare state 
(I will discuss further in Part II). Policymakers restructured the parenting benefit from a 
transfer payment to an earnings replacement benefit. Three primary objectives of the 
2007 policy are as follows:  
1. To financially support new families after childbirth;  
 2. To strengthen incentives for mothers to return to work soon after birth; 
 3. To enhance parental involvement in childcare (Chirkova, 2012). 
 
The major changes from the 2007 policy occurred in the transformations of the parental 
leave and benefits structure. Parents who gave birth on or after January 1, 2007 became 
eligible for “parent’s money” or Elterngeld. This new child-rearing benefit system 
amounts to 67% of average net monthly earnings, from the 12 months prior to the birth, 
for the parent who takes leave. The monetary limits of the benefit are a minimum 
payment of €300 per month and maximum payment of €1,800 per month. The new 
benefit is only granted for twelve months if just one parent takes leave, and up to fourteen 
months if both parents choose to take leave. Single parents automatically receive the 
benefit for fourteen months. Parents who are unemployed prior to birth receive a standard 
allowance of €300 per month.  Parents with net earnings below €1,000 prior to the birth 
receive a little more than two-thirds of their previous income. In the case of multiple 
births (i.e. twins), the parenting benefit rises €300 per child. Parents working in any type 
of employment– fixed-term contracts, part-time work, and marginal employment—can 
also take advantage of this policy. Carried over from the 2001 policy, parents taking 
leave are allowed to work up to thirty hours per week while still receiving the benefit. 
The 2007 policy reforms increase the amount of monthly benefit payments, but by cutting 
the eligibility period in half the German government drastically reduced costs. In 2007, 
the estimated policy costs were €3.87 billion per year, whereas the 2001 estimated costs 
were roughly €180 billion per year (Mätze & Ostner, 2010). The problem with the 2001 
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benefit scheme was its financial incentives for longer work interruptions. Under the 2001 
policy, it was more advantageous to take the two-year leave option. The 2007 reform 
attempts to overturn this system, and instead encourage faster reintegration of mothers 
into the labor force. How, then, did the 2007 policy changes influence a mother’s return-
to-work intention following childbirth?  
 
 
II. Literature Review 
 
The bulk of existing literature related to Germany’s parental leave policies predominantly 
studies the effectiveness of policies in place before the 2007 reforms. There have been 
several studies examining the causal relationship between longer leave periods and return 
to work delays. One of the first contributions to the literature, Ondrich et al. (2002) 
conclude that the German government’s generous extensions in benefit duration implies 
that mothers are less likely to return to work during the benefit protection periods. Using 
micro-level data from the GSOEP for West German mothers in the 1990s, they discover 
that previously employed mothers were likely to take the full extent of available leave. 
Also, their results suggest that mothers are more likely to remain at home when there is 
greater time allotted for benefit receipt and job protection (Ondrich et al., 2002). Also, 
Ruhm and Teague (1995) study the changes from federal leave policies in seventeen 
industrialized nations between 1968 and 1988. The study concluded that paid leave 
periods of “moderate” length, i.e. twenty-five to fifty weeks, are positively related to 
increases in female labor force participation (after parental leave), but policies beyond 
this length have negative effects (Ruhm & Teague, 1995).  
Scholars in this field of research have also conducted cross-country comparisons 
to analyze the strength of family policies across different labor markets. One study carries 
out an analysis between Germany, Great Britain, and Sweden, to estimate the return to 
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work probability for mothers within the first twenty-four months after childbirth 
(Gustafsson, S., Wetzels, C., Vlasblom, J., & Dex, S, 1996). Their logit analysis of panel 
data shows the highest return probabilities among career oriented, highly educated 
women. For these women in particular, opportunity costs of children are very high, 
making them more likely to supply more labor following childbirth. Interestingly, these 
authors also found that 80% of Swedish mothers have re-entered the labor market 
compared to 55% of German women by the time the child is three years old (Gustafsson 
et al., 1996). Although Europe is most referenced for having a longstanding history of 
mandated parental leave policies, scholars compare the strengths of these policies in other 
regions. During the late 1990s and early 2000s, most advanced European nations, with 
policies already in place, began to expand the range of benefits offered to parents. For 
example, in 2000, Germany and Canada extended the time durations for benefit eligibility 
and leave; following in their footsteps were the United Kingdom (2002) and Denmark 
(2003). Baker and Milligan (2008) found that extending the length of the Canadian 
maternal leave period from twenty-five to fifty weeks was associated with mothers 
spending longer time on leave before returning to work. Altogether, these studies 
demonstrate that longer leave periods–across the board– are disadvantageous for a 
nation’s labor market outcomes.  
Focusing on Germany, Bergemann and Riphahn (2011) use data from the German 
Socio-Economic Panel to test the hypothesis that higher transfers and cuts in the benefit 
entitlement period are associated with an increase in mothers labor force participation. 
More specifically, they expect the 2007 policy to increase the return to work probability 
after the first twelve months following childbirth. They primarily draw these conclusions 
with reference to the neoclassical model of labor supply. According to their hypothesis, 
mothers under the 2007 policy reform (compared with mothers under the previous policy) 
 12 
are more likely to return to the labor force after the benefit’s term dissolves. Their 
research on the 2007 reform also suggests a possible increase in the desire to minimize 
the time between births because of the better financial benefits. At the end of the transfer 
period, mothers on leave experience a sizeable income drop, which gives them incentive 
to substitute the benefit with labor earnings. Also, this hypothesis emphasizes that the 
2007 reform’s reduction in benefit payment period (from twenty-four months to twelve 
months) encouraged faster speeds of intended return. The results from their probit 
estimations are insignificant and do not support this hypothesis, however. Chirkova 
(2012) argues that the drop in income levels after the benefits expire has a strong impact 
on women’s return to work intentions immediately following childbirth. Accordingly, 
this results in decreased participation rates of women with newborns in the first year but 
higher participation rates during the second year. Yet Chirkova’s empirical results 
suggest a decline in the probability of women returning to work in both the first and 
second year of motherhood (2012). Both papers present conclusions consistent with the 
hypothesis that the 2007 reforms had a negative effect on return-to-work probabilities 
during the first twelve months. Conversely, Chirkova’s empirical results contradict 
Bergemann and Riphahn’s second year findings from their 2011 study. Chirkova explains 
her contradictory results as being due largely to the effects that child-care availability has 
on a woman’s employment decision. Finally, though Kluve and Tamm (2009) observe 
similar outcomes, they use a natural experiment design with data collected by health 
insurance firms. The strong incentive for mothers to stay home post-delivery results in 
significantly lower participation rates during the first twelve months. Unlike Chirkova, 
however, they found a significant decrease in mothers' employment return likelihood 
during the 12 months after giving birth, and a significant increase in mothers' return 
probability after the transfer expires (Kluve & Tamm, 2009). 
 13 
Much like these previous studies, I am interested in determining if the cuts in 
benefit duration and increases in financial incentives had the effect of reversing previous 
trends in employment following childbirth. The majority of researchers design their 
models by studying one year before and after the 2007 policy reforms. By looking at the 
years right before the 2007 policy was enacted, researchers must account for the fact that 
women might change their behavior in expectation of the reforms. This paper takes a 
different approach to study the policy’s effects by utilizing two years after the 2001 
policy and two years after the 2007 policy. Moreover, by using 2003– when the 2007 
reform was not on people’s radar– I avoid any biases due to changes in mother’s 
expectations. I study how mothers reacted to these two different parental leave systems. 
As the data I present in Chapter IV suggests, the 2007 reform was effective in motivating 
mothers’ return to work.  
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III. Theory 
Classic Labor Supply Model:  
 
A mother’s decision to work after birth is contingent upon several factors influencing her 
overall lifetime utility. Classic economic theories attempt to weigh all associated costs 
and benefits surrounding her choice. No matter how one looks at it, however, the model 
boils down to a woman’s value of her own time. Neoclassical labor supply theory models 
an individual’s decision to work (and how much to work) based on the tradeoff between 
labor and leisure. The goal for an individual is to maximize his/her utility by choosing the 
optimal allocation of his/her time. For parents, their allocation of time is a tradeoff 
between labor and household production, both of which cut into available leisure time. 
Household production consumes parent’s leisure time in this basic model. It represents 
the allocation of an individual’s time specifically towards rearing children and common 
household activities– cleaning, cooking, etc. The neoclassical labor supply model isolates 
several factors that determine whether or not a person works and if he/she does how 
many hours are spent working. 
In the basic labor supply model, every worker is faced with a budget constraint 
representing all labor-leisure tradeoffs. Assuming a constant wage and a time endowment 
of T, the individual’s budget constraint is: 𝑌 = 𝑤(𝑇 − 𝑙)+ 𝑌 
Where Y is total consumption, 𝑌 is non-labor consumption, and 𝑙 is hours of leisure. For 
every hour of leisure the individual gives up w in earned income. Therefore, the cost of 
one hour of leisure is equal to w. This basic model can be represented graphically in the 
following two examples Figure 1: 
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Figure 1. Labor Market Budget Constraints 
 
 
 
For my analysis it is crucial to recognize how the budget line changes when certain 
circumstances change. Panel A of Figure 1 demonstrates a parallel outward shift of the 
budget line because non-labor income, 𝑌, increases. This increase in non-labor income, 
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while holding wage constant, expands the worker’s opportunity set or budget constraint. 
In contrast, Panel B shows how the budget line rotates out along the consumption axis 
when the wage rate increases. For this paper, it is important to have a basic understanding 
of the manipulations in budget constraints that occur due to changes in non-labor income. 
Lastly, I introduce two central components of the classic model that result from 
changes in an individual’s budget constraint– the income and substitution effects. First, 
the income effect measures the impact of a change in non-labor income on the number of 
hours worked (Panel A, in Figure 1). When looking at the income effect, it is important 
to define whether leisure is a “normal” or “inferior” good. Assuming all else equal, if a 
person’s income increases then so does his/her demand for better quality goods– “normal 
goods.” If that person’s income decreases, his/her demand for lower quality or off brand 
goods– “inferior goods”– increases, because these are more affordable. Suppose leisure is 
a normal good, an increase in non-labor income increases the demand for leisure and 
decreases the hours of market work. The cost of rearing children increases when income 
rises In terms of Germany’s 2007 reform the increased monthly benefit represents an 
increase in non-labor income, and an increase in demand for leisure–according to the 
income effect. If leisure time is normal (which is supported in the literature for women in 
general and particularly for mothers), more parents are expected to take advantage of paid 
leave. Alternatively, the substitution effect measures the impact of a change in wage rates 
on the number of hours worked. Holding non-labor income constant, an increase in the 
wage rate will raise the price of leisure, thus increasing the incentive to work and 
decreasing the demand for leisure.  
Since labor and leisure are opposites, it is difficult to make conclusions about the 
magnitude of the income and substitution effects when studying them together. On the 
one hand, a rising wage gives workers larger opportunity sets. According to the income 
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effect this situation causes an increase in their demand for leisure therefore decreasing 
labor supply. At the same time, however, the substitution effect stipulates that leisure has 
become relatively more expensive (measured in terms of w) giving the workers more 
incentive to leisure less in order to work more and consume more. Changes in a mother’s 
budget constraint ultimately influence her decision to return to work, however, this can 
also be affected by factors outside of the classic model– such as her preferences and 
human capital depreciation. 
 
Human Capital Concerns 
For a proper analysis of the tradeoff a mother faces between labor and leisure, I construct 
a model to illustrate the constraints a woman faces when choosing the optimal allocation 
of her time. A mother must weigh all of her costs and benefits associated with the choice 
to take leave and the decision to return to work. First, let the time period immediately 
following the birth of a child be the present time period (time=0). The cost of one hour of 
time=0 leisure is equal to her future wage penalty, which represents her diminished 
earnings potential due to work absence. In this model, the utility derived from leisure 
time (i.e. staying at home) is measured by benefit amount. Her basic choice, excluding 
human capital depreciation, looks like this: 𝑢(𝑝, 𝑏) ≥ 𝑢(0,𝑤) 
This equation says that she will choose to take leave if the benefits outweigh the costs. 
The term 𝑢  (𝑝, 𝑏) represents the utility from her decision to stay at home, which factors 
in the leisure time from taking the policy 𝑝 and the benefit amount 𝑏. The right side 
represents her costs from either choice– taking leave and earning nothing or working and 
earning 𝑤. In order for her to choose to exit the labor force following the birth of a child, 
her utility from consuming more leisure, i.e. each additional day of leave, must be greater 
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than her wages foregone by not working. Her final decision to return to work following 
childbirth is expressed mathematically in the following equation: 𝑢 𝑝, 𝑏 + 𝛾w ≤ 2w 
The future wage penalty she will incur by staying at home instead of working is 
represented by the term 𝛾w. Future wage penalty (𝛾) is used to represent her opportunity 
costs from taking leave multiplied by her current wage. The future wage penalty is 
dependent on various market forces– employer tastes, re-entry barriers, and human 
capital depreciation. These contingencies, associated with a mother leaving the labor 
force, place pressure on the allocation of her time. The right side of the equation contains 
the term 2w, which denotes the wage she would earn if she chooses to work both periods 
instead of taking leave. In order for her to choose to work both periods instead of taking 
leave, her utility from staying home plus her future wage penalty she suffers from taking 
leave must be less than or equal to double her wage. As her utility of staying at home 
increases then she becomes more likely to extend her leave time and stay out of market 
work.  
Moreover, the two effects measured within the classic model–the income and 
substitution effects– also influence her choice. First, the income effect stipulates that if an 
increase in income occurs, (wages and preferences held constant) the number of leisure 
hours demanded will rise and the hours of work desired will decrease when leisure is a 
normal good. Alternatively, the substitution effect shows that if income is held constant, 
an increase in the wage rate will raise the price of and reduce the demand for leisure, 
since they work in opposite directions for a typical wage change. Thus the substitution 
effect increases her incentives to work. Altogether, these factors place pressure on a 
woman’s tradeoff between her labor and leisure when she is choosing to re-enter or exit 
the labor force following the birth of a child.  
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Model of the 2007 Reforms 
Considering the neoclassical model of labor supply, what does the 2007 policy’s 
increased benefit amount and shortened eligibility period do to a woman’s budget 
constraint? Furthermore, how does this affect her decision to work? The answers to these 
questions are complex; I offer a specific application of income and substitution effects to 
find answers. Germany’s 2007 parental leave reforms changed the budget constraint 
faced by mothers, specifically by increasing the monthly benefit (non-labor income) 
amount while also decreasing the eligibility period (time constraint). In reference to the 
policy, the income and substitution effects both influence a mother’s return-to-work 
decision differently. The budget constraint is higher for those women under the 2007 
reforms compared to their predecessors under the 2001 policy regime. The 2007 reform 
has the effect of expanding the budget constraint, by changing the price of staying at 
home and increasing the non-labor incomes of those women who are newly eligible. 
Under the old regime the maximum amount a woman could receive for one month of 
leave was €450 total. After the 2007 reform this maximum ceiling became €1,800 per 
month. To understand how her decision will change let’s consider a woman with a pre-
birth income of €1,000 per month. If she decides to take leave for a year under the 2007 
policy, she will be receiving €670 per month as compared to the previous €450 amount.  
Looking strictly at the effects of the increased monetary benefit following the 
2007 reforms, we can assume that both income and substitution effects will negatively 
affect her decision to return to work during the first twelve months of leave. First, the 
income effect asserts that there is an increase in demand for leisure because the increased 
benefit amount makes it more affordable. The income effect states that there will be an 
increased demand for leisure, following the 2007 reforms, because the woman feels 
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wealthier than she would have under the 2001 policy. Moreover, the reforms effectively 
decreased the cost of staying home for women taking leave. Looking back to our 
equation, this means that her utility of staying home, 𝑢   𝑝 , increased since leisure 
became relatively cheaper. Both effects give her more incentive to take the full extent of 
this leave option. The income and substitution effects are modeled in a two-year 
comparison of a mother’s budget constraint in Figure 3: 
Figure 3: Two-Year Policy Comparison 
 
Theory and Predictions 
This paper’s theory suggests that the 2007 policy reform effectively encourages female 
labor force participation. The paper predicts that the twelve-month time restriction is the 
most important component of the 2007 policy changes. In order to reap the full extent of 
the benefits under the 2001 policy, it was more advantageous for the parent taking leave 
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to choose the two-year option. In reference to Figure 3, the one year leave option pays 
€450 per month, after twelve months totaling to €5,400 in benefits for one year of leave. 
Under the 2001 policy, the two-year leave option pays €300 per month– after twenty-
four months this equals €7,200 in benefits, which is financially more rewarding than the 
one-year leave option. This fiscal incongruity essentially rewards longer employment 
leaves. Understanding whether or not this incentive scheme actually affects human 
behavior can be difficult. A woman might be more likely to opt-out of work and instead 
receive compensation for staying at home with her newborn baby for the first years of his 
or her life. After the 2007 reforms, this extended period of compensation was no longer 
an option for parents. To account for this change, while still encouraging fertility, the 
new policy significantly increased the monetary incentive. Following the 2007 policy, the 
parent on leave could receive up to €8,040 (€670*12) in benefits for up to one year. This 
new parental benefit is significantly greater than it was in both the one-year and two-year 
leave options under the 2001 policy.  
The two-year comparison budget constraint in Figure 3 shows that once the 
twelve-month period is over, a parent in 2007 has more incentive to replace the high 
benefit with labor earnings. Why? The sizeable income decrease at the end of the twelve-
month period provides the parent on leave strong incentive to maintain household income 
levels by returning to work. This resembles the causal effects of paying a higher benefit 
for a reduced time period. The previous example of the substitution effect demonstrates 
that the policy changes induce women to substitute labor with leisure because leisure has 
become relatively less expensive. I predict that women on leave, following the 2007 
policy reforms, will be more likely to substitute the monthly benefit payments with labor 
income after the twelve month period ends. Here the income effect points to an increased 
demand for leisure during the 2007 benefit eligibility period because she feels relatively 
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wealthier– compared to the 2001 policy. Once the twelve-month eligibility period has 
elapsed, however, she loses the benefit and the income effect becomes insignificant. In 
fact, I argue that the income effect following the twelve months will induce her to 
demand more labor as she will feel relatively poorer following the benefit’s expiration. 
Therefore my model predicts that the 2007 policy reforms have the effect of discouraging 
long employment interruptions because of the increased likelihood of women intending 
to return to work sooner after the twelve months of paid parental leave. 
 
 
IV: Empirical Analysis 
 
This chapter first presents my analysis’ data and methodology. It then discuss my results, 
studying the effect of the policy change on new mother’s intent to return to the labor 
force. Within this discussion, the paper also considers the effect on intended speed of her 
return. The supplementary output tables from each probit regression are embedded within 
the analysis. Also include here is an analysis the policy’s effect on a new mother’s return 
decision by the probabilities of her response to the following categories: no return, 
expected return within two to five years, and expected return within one year or less. This 
output is found in my ordered response model, which concludes this section. 
 
Data and Methods 
I use data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP). Started in 1984, SOEP 
conducts annual surveys of private households and individuals in Germany. The original 
survey, which contained roughly 12,000 respondents, has now expanded to well over 
22,000 respondents each year. The primary goal of the survey is to collect micro-level 
data on individuals and families in order to measure demographics and changes in living 
situations. The general population survey covers a wide variety of topics every year 
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ranging from: population, education and training, labor market dynamics, earnings, 
housing, health, satisfaction with life, and household production (Frick & Haisken-
DeNew, 2005). The questionnaires are distributed through face-to-face interviews with 
all members of a survey household aged sixteen years and older. There are many 
different extensions of the general population questionnaires. For the purpose of this 
study, however, I predominantly use data collected from the “Living in Germany” 
questionnaire and its extensions on employment information. The survey consists of 
cross-sectional data.  
Cross-sectional data’s structure offers a one-dimensional evaluation of new 
mothers’ behaviors, before and after the enactment of Germany’s 2007 reforms. I use the 
cross-sectional data on recent mothers in 2003 and again in 2009 to theoretically model 
how policy changes affect a mother’s consumption of the benefit as well her decision to 
return work. Moreover, I narrow my sample to focus exclusively on new mothers. By 
definition, “new mothers,” as females with an infant, i.e. a child between the ages of zero 
and one year old, in the current survey year. Restricting the data to this sample allows me 
to measure new mothers who gave birth under each different policy structure. Since the 
model consists of binomial dependent variables (representing return-to-work intentions) a 
marginal effects probit regression is utilized. The probit regression estimates the 
maximum likelihood (probability) that an individual observation will fall into one of two 
categories with zero or one likelihoods. In my model, I consider two different dependent 
variables: a mother’s intention to return to work and the expected speed of her return. 
These variables are taken directly from the question in the survey asking individuals who 
indicate they are currently out of the labor force, but not unemployed or in active service, 
(including parents on leave). The first question asks if these individuals intend to return 
to employment. The follow-up question, for those individuals that indicate a likely return, 
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asks them when they expect to return, the possible answers were as follows: 1) yes, 
within one year or less 2) yes, within two to five years. The first dependent variable, 
“Return Likelihood” simply indicates her self-reported likelihood or probability of 
returning to the labor market at anytime before or after her maternity leave benefits 
expire; and the second dependent variable, “Return Speed” measures the expected speed 
of her return. For the second dependent variable, “fast” represents an expected return to 
work within a year or less, and “slow” indicates the time frame within two–five years or 
more. The model also includes a binomial policy variable to compare differences in the 
two sample years. The policy variable equals zero for the year 2003 and one for 2009. If 
the 2007 reform is effective in increasing the probability and speed of a mother’s return, 
as I expect, then the probit outcomes will return positive coefficients on the policy 
variable. The following equation estimates a mother’s intention to return to work: 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 =  ∝   +  𝛽!𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑑 + 𝛽!𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝛽!𝑓𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑝𝑦 +𝛽!𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑥𝑝 + 𝛽!𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 + 𝛽!𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑐 + 𝛽!𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑛ℎℎ +𝛽!𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽!𝑎𝑔𝑒! + 𝛽!"𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦 + 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟  
I supplement the binomial probit regressions with an ordered probit model, which 
tests which return response has the strongest likelihood. Models involving choice 
probabilities are often referred to as ordered models. This type of model utilizes an 
ordinal dependent variable. An ordinal variable is categorical and ordered by response– 
for instance “poor,” “good,” and “excellent.”  In the classical labor supply example of an 
ordered probit model the question asks women what amount of work they desire. Three 
alternative discrete choices are offered: no work, part-time work, and full-time work. 
These choices are ordered and distinguished by women’s desired combination of labor 
and leisure. In this paper, I utilize this approach to predict new mother’s self-reported 
intentions of returning to work after childbirth. My ordered probit model consists of a 
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dependent variable, “Return Order”, which logically orders a new mother’s return 
decision by three distinct options: no return (0), return within two to five years (1), and 
return within one year or less (2). According to neo-classical labor supply theory, her 
desire to return to work, as measured by the three possible answers, will ultimately 
depend on her preferences and budget constraint. As my theory predicts, I assume the 
2007 policy changes increase the probabilities of new mothers in 2009 returning to work. 
My model tests the effect of the policy controlling for the following variables: 
education levels, work experience, marital status, full time employment in the previous 
year, income levels, number of children, and age. Together, these independent variables 
are quantifiable outside factors that affect her preferences and budget constraint 
following childbirth. Some of the explanatory variables signify her opportunity costs 
while others help determine her utility of staying at home. First I will discuss the 
independent variables that represent a new mother’s human capital attainment and overall 
attachment to the labor force. In reference to the equation representing a new mother’s 
decision to return to work, the following variables: “university degree”, “work 
experience”, and “full time work experience” account for differences in her human 
capital depreciation 𝛾  from extending leave. The binomial education variable, 
“University Degree” equals one if the mother holds a university degree and zero 
otherwise.1 According to human capital theory, I expect to see a positive relationship 
between a mother’s level of education and the two dependent return variables because 
highly educated women have a higher opportunity cost from taking longer leaves.2 
Additionally, I include two independent variables in the model to represent a mother’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 I defined the university degree for those individual observations with eighteen or more years of 
education, the number of years signifying obtainment of education at the university level in Germany. 
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labor force attachment. The first is an explanatory variable to represent her total previous 
work experience, defined by the total years of previous full-time and part-time 
employment experience. I also include an independent variable “Full Time Work 
Experience” to indicate if she was employed full time in the year immediately prior to 
giving birth. I use these two work experience variables interchangeably to see which is 
more significant. For new mothers with extensive histories of full-time work, I expect a 
greater likelihood of return-to-work because of the negative effects on human capital 
depreciation from long durations of leave. Higher levels of education and more work 
experience raise her opportunity costs of lengthy career breaks.  
In order to estimate a mother’s ultimate decision to take leave, I incorporate the 
following independent variables in the model: “Marital Status,” “Outside Income,” 
“Individual Income,” and “Number of Children in Household (HH).” From the 
conclusions of Gary Becker’s theory on household production, I predict that new mothers 
who are married are less likely to return to work than their single counterparts.3 The 
binomial variable for marital status originates from a marital status categorical variable; 
“married” includes all individuals who are legally married, spouse present or absent, at 
the time of the survey. A spouse being absent includes those individuals who are married 
to military or Foreign Service members; therefore, I decided to keep these observations in 
the model. I assume that married mothers might derive greater utility from staying at 
home because it is more affordable for them since their husband’s income provides an 
additional safety net. Thus, the income effect causes married mothers to feel relatively 
wealthier and demand more leisure when on leave. For this same reason, I predict new 
mothers with access to outside income sources will be more likely to stay out of the labor 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Gary Becker’s “Human Capital, Effort, and the Sexual Division of Labor” stipulates that married 
women can split their time dedicated to household chores and raising children with their husband. Since, 
their husband’s income also supplements total household income so they are not expected to be primary 
caretakers nor providers.  
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force for longer periods of time. The explanatory variable representing outside income is 
an interaction term created by taking the total household income generated through labor 
earnings and subtracting individual income. Lastly, the independent variable representing 
the number of children in the household is defined as the number of people under the age 
of eighteen living in a household (at the time of survey), with a maximum of ten. As the 
number of children in the household increases I expect to see a negative effect on a 
mother’s intentions to return to work because she must devote more of her time to 
household production. For the most part, these independent variables increase a new 
mother’s utility from staying at home and encourage longer work interruptions.  
The summary statistics, presented in Table 3, show 597 total new mothers for 
2003 and 2009.  I first present the statistics for the entire sample followed by a brief 
account of each year separately (Tables 4 & 5).  
Table 3: Summary Statistics for 2003 & 2009 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Return Likelihood 0.630 0.483 0 1 
Return Speed 0.233 0.423 0 1 
Return Order 0.863 0.765 0 2 
Marital Status 0.709 0.455 0 1 
University Degree 0.143 0.350 0 1 
Employment Status 0.588 0.493 0 1 
Full Time Work Experience 0.357 0.479 0 1 
Total Work Experience 5.275 4.755 0 22.9 
Individual Income 8.968 23.560 0 508 
Outside Income 33.786 28.535 0 264 
Maternity Benefit 2.304 2.965 0 21.352 
Single Mom 0.253 0.435 0 1 
Number of Children in HH 1.975 1.189 1 8 
Age 31.250 5.681 17 49 
Age squared 1,008.754 357.895 289 2401 
Policy 0.474 0.500 0 1 
 Note: There are 597 observations 
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To begin with, the majority of all new mothers, roughly 70.9%, are married. The average 
number of children in this sample is roughly two children per woman; and, the average 
age of new mothers is approximately 31 years old. The maximum age of mothers is 
cutoff at 49 years old.4 New mothers who posses a university degree (or higher) only 
make up 14.3% of the sample. New mother’s previous full-time work experience is only 
five and a quarter years, which is lower than I expected. Looking specifically at the full 
time work experience indicator variable, roughly 35% of the sample was employed in full 
time work in the year prior to the survey date.5 As far as the dependent variables are 
concerned, roughly 63% of all new mothers indicate a positive intention to return to work 
at any given time. Within the 63% that indicate a likely return, an estimated 23.3% of 
new mothers intend to return within one year or less.  
Table 4: Summary Statistics for 2003 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Return Likelihood 0.592 0.492 0 1 
Return Speed 0.191 0.394 0 1 
Return Order 0.783 0.744 0 2 
Marital Status 0.707 0.456 0 1 
University Degree 0.124 0.330 0 1 
Employment Status 0.564 0.497 0 1 
Full Time Work Experience 0.350 0.478 0 1 
Total Work Experience 4.928 4.310 0 17.4 
Individual Income 7.227 11.000 0 84 
Outside Income 33.441 27.244 0 216 
Maternity Benefit 1.876 2.489 0 21.352 
Single Mom 0.248 0.433 0 1 
Number of Children in HH 1.975 1.241 1 8 
Age 30.653 5.702 17 49 
Age squared 972.010 354.610 289 2401 
 Note: There are 314 observations 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 I dropped seven outlier observations that included women who reported being over the age of 50 
years old and having a newborn infant.  
 
5 After checking the data for the fulltime and employed variables I found that six observations reported 
being unemployed and full-time. The mismatch in this data is most likely due to a reporting error; to 
account for the error these six observations are dropped from the data set.  
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Table 5: Summary Statistics for 2009 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Return Likelihood 0.671 0.471 0 1 
Return Speed 0.279 0.449 0 1 
Return Order 0.951 0.779 0 2 
Marital Status 0.710 0.454 0 1 
University Degree 0.165 0.372 0 1 
Employment Status 0.615 0.487 0 1 
Full Time Work Experience 0.364 0.482 0 1 
Total Work Experience 5.686 5.210 0 22.9 
Individual Income 10.901 32.121 0 508 
Outside Income 34.168 29.946 0 264 
Maternity Benefit 2.779 3.357 0 20.9 
Single Mom 0.258 0.438 0 1 
Number of Children in HH 1.975 1.131 1 8 
Age 31.912 5.593 17 47 
Age squared 1049.523 357.728 289 2209 
  Note: There are 283 total observations 
In order to carry out the empirical analysis of these dependent variables between 
the two years, the variable “Policy” serves as the primary object of concern. This variable 
alone offers a direct comparison of new mothers’ intentions before and after the 2007 
reforms. Evidently these summary statistics verify that relatively more new mothers, and 
infants, were observed in 2003 compared to 2009.6 Out of the total sample population, 
53% of new mothers were observed in 2003 and 47% in 2009. Looking at the year 2003 
first, (Table 4) approximately 59% of the new mothers intended to return to the labor 
force, while 19% of that subsample intended a fast return. Alternatively, their 2009 
counterparts show stronger prospects for labor force participation (Table 5). As 
previously mentioned, the sample of new mothers in 2009 is somewhat smaller; noting 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 OECD’s 2013 “Fertility Rates of Women Aged 15 to 49.” 
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this, we still see larger percentages of these women intending to return to work. In the 
2009 sample of new mothers, 67% show positive intentions to re-enter employment and 
around 28% of them are likely to return within a year or less. These statistics reinforce 
the theory’s predictions and support the hypothesis that policy-induced changes 
encourage increased labor force participation following the 2007 reforms. 
 
Results and Analysis 
The output in Table 6 shows results from the probit estimation on effects of the 2007 
policy reforms on a new mother’s likelihood of return.  
Table 6: Probit Results for Return Likelihood 
Variable Outcome 
Married -0.215 
 
(0.133) 
University Degree -0.386* 
 
(0.164) 
Full Time Work Experience -0.277* 
 
(0.132) 
Individual Income 0.000 
 
(-0.00000247) 
Outside Income 0.000 
 
(-0.00000205) 
Number of Children in HH -0.213** 
 
(0.061) 
Age 0.103 
 
(0.092) 
Age squared -0.002 
 
(0.001) 
Policy 0.244* 
 
(0.111) 
Constant -0.579 
 
(1.437) 
Observations 565 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.043 
*Indicates significance at the 5% level 
** Indicates significance at the 1% confidence level 
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The explanatory variable “Policy” symbolizes the primary 2007 policy’s changes–the 
increased benefit amount for a shorter time period, and is therefore the central focus of 
forthcoming analysis. The sampling frame of the data, 565 observations, represents the 
non-missing values for all of the variables included in this model. Unexpectedly, the 
independent variables for university degree and full time work experience returned 
negative coefficients, statistically significant at the 5% confidence level. In reference to 
the human capital theory, I expected to see a positive relationship between these variables 
and her return likelihood since highly educated women have a higher opportunity cost 
from taking longer leaves. Yet, my results could indicate that this group of new mothers 
purposefully chooses to spend more time at home with their newborns, and they can 
afford to do so because their previous earnings were high. As expected, an increasing 
number of children in the household produce a negative effect on new mothers’ 
probability of returning to employment. The estimations on return likelihood yield a 
positive and significant reform effect as represented by the positive estimation on the 
policy variable. Interpreting this variable specifically, I expect that new mothers in 2009 
are more likely than new mothers in 2003 to re-enter the labor force in the future, so the 
policy was effective in its goal of increasing female labor supply. 
The results from the second probit model on “Return Speed”, depicted in Table 7, 
also confirm the theory’s prediction about the speed of a new mother’s return following 
the 2007 reforms. As aforementioned, the return speed dummy is coded with one 
equaling a fast return. Unlike the previous probit regression, marital status produces a 
statistically significant negative effect on a new mother’s speed of intended return. This 
means that married new mothers are more likely to return within two to five years and 
less likely to return within one year or less. This finding evidently corresponds with 
theories on household production. Moreover, one can assume that married mothers are 
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more likely, than single mothers, to extend the duration of their leave periods because 
they can afford to since they have access to their spouse’s income. Furthermore, 
according to the income effect, the 2007 policy’s institution of increased benefits causes 
new mothers to feel wealthier overall. Thus causing them to demand more leisure in the 
twelve-month policy period. The combination of a married mother’s access to her 
spouse’s income and the additional benefit makes her even more likely to extend leave 
period beyond twelve months. 
Table 7: Probit Results for Return Speed 
Variable Outcome 
Married -0.500** 
 
(0.137) 
University Degree 0.019 
 
(0.181) 
Full Time Work Experience 0.113 
 
(0.144) 
Individual Income 0.000 
 
(0.000) 
Outside Income 0.000 
 
(0.000) 
Number of Children in HH -0.208* 
 
(0.077) 
Age 0.121 
 
(0.106) 
Age squared -0.002 
 
(0.002) 
Policy 0.304* 
 
(0.122) 
Constant -2.048 
 
(1.619) 
Observations 565 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.0612 
*Indicates significance at the 5% level 
** Indicates significance at the 1% confidence level 
Interestingly enough, the coefficients on education and labor force attachment control 
variables are positive. Yet, we cannot make any predictions because the results for these 
variables are statistically insignificant. Most important for the purpose of this study, the 
policy reform effect variable returned positive and statistically significant results again. 
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This test measures the probability that new mothers will return fast (within a year or less) 
or slow (two to five years, or more). A positive and statistically significant result on the 
“Policy” variable indicates that new mothers in 2009 are more likely to return within one 
year less to the labor force, following childbirth, than new mothers in 2003. Accordingly, 
after the 2007 reforms, new mothers have a higher likelihood of returning to work within 
one year or less. These results parallel my theory’s prediction that the 2007 policy 
incentivizes mothers to return to work sooner than before because of the benefit time 
restriction. Furthermore, the significant income drop new mother’s experience (after the 
twelve months pass) gives them more incentive to substitute the benefit income with 
labor earnings. 
Table 8: Ordered Probit Regression  
Variable Outcome 
Married -0.363** 
 (0.114) 
University Degree -0.237 
 (0.148) 
Full Time Work Experience -0.112 
 (0.115) 
Individual Income -0.210** 
 (0.056) 
Outside Income -0.000 
 (0.000) 
Number of Children in HH 0.000 
 (0.000) 
Age 0.120 
 (0.082) 
Age squared -0.002 
 (0.001) 
Policy 0.269** 
 (0.096) 
Observations 566 
Pseudo R-Squared  0.347 
*Indicates significance at the 5% level 
** Indicates significance at the 1% confidence level 
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Table 9: Marginal Fixed Effects  
Marginal Fixed Effects: Return Order 
Variable No Return (0) Slow Return (1) Fast Return (2) 
policy -0.101** 0.021* 0.080** 
 
(0.036) (0.009) (0.029) 
*Indicates significance at the 5% level 
** Indicates significance at the 1% confidence level 
 
Presented in Table 8, is the output from my ordered probit regression on “Return 
Order.” The results from an ordered probit regression and the marginal fixed effects of its 
estimation support these initial tests indicating that the policy is effective in encouraging 
mother’s return-to-work intentions and expected speeds. The dependent variable in this 
model “Return Order” is a categorical variable, not continuous; because of this, the 
coefficient 0.269, attached to the “Policy” predictor is not the mere change in likelihood 
as it was in the previous two regressions. The dependent variable here codes a return time 
of one year or less as the highest response category. On that note, the ordered probit 
results return a negative coefficient on the marital status indicator, which is statistically 
significant at the 1% level. This outcome supports my prediction that being married has a 
strong negative influence on a new mother’s expected return, in both years. Therefore, 
the results from the ordered probit output suggest that new mothers in 2009 show the 
highest probabilities of returning to work within one year or less and returning at all, but 
the decomposition of the effects on each of these separately requires a marginal fixed 
effects calculation. 
 35 
I follow up this ordered response model by running marginal fixed effects to 
calculate the elasticities of the variables as related to each separate category of the 
“Return Order” indicator variable. The first marginal effects calculate the probabilities of 
the predicted outcome that new mothers show no intention to return to work (i.e. “Fast 
Return” equals zero). The policy variable returned a negative marginal effect significant 
at the 1% level. This means that a woman in 2009 is roughly10 percentage points less 
likely than her 2003 counterpart to reveal no intention of returning to work at all. The 
second column of marginal fixed effects shows the outcome of a likely and slow return 
(within two to five years or more, i.e. “Fast Return” equals one). For this category, the 
policy variable returned positive and statistically significant marginal effect at the 1% 
level.  This calculation yields a positive policy effect; so, a slow expected return is 
approximately 2 percentage points more likely for a woman in 2009 than her 2003 
counterpart. Finally, the category for the fastest return (within one year or less, i.e. “Fast 
Return” equals two) is computed using the marginal effects test. These results confirm 
that new mothers in 2009 have the highest probabilities of intending to return to work 
within one year or less. Altogether, the marginal effects estimations from the ordered 
probit conclude that new mothers in 2009 have higher probabilities of future return to 
work as well a faster intended speed.   
 
Discussion  
Chapters I through IV in Part I of the paper considers the effects of the paradigm 
shift in German family policy following the 2007 parental leave reforms. In these 
chapters, I assess the policy’s efficiency in strengthening incentives for new mothers to 
return to work soon after childbirth.  The findings from my empirical analysis suggest the 
reform significantly increased the likelihood of new mothers intending to return to work 
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and the speed at which they do so. These conclusions are supportive of Bergemann and 
Riphahn’s previous studies, which determine that the reform succeeds in shortening 
mothers’ employment interruptions (2011). Evident from the model’s outcomes, the 
positive policy effect signifies a higher return probability amongst new mothers in 2009 
compared to 2003. Moreover, the ordered probit regressions and corresponding marginal 
effects tests suggest that new mothers in 2009 showed the highest likelihoods of returning 
to work within one year or less. Overall, the changes in the benefit scheme––paying 
higher transfers for a limited time–– significantly discourage new mothers from 
extending their employment breaks after childbirth. These shortened employment 
interruptions should reduce the human capital depreciation and wage penalties faced by 
German mothers, who were previously prolonging employment after childbirth. In the 
long run, these effects produce beneficial outcomes for a mother’s maintenance of a 
healthy work and family life balance. This paper’s quantitative results yield evidence that 
Germany’s 2007 policy has succeeded one of its goals, encouraging mothers return to 
work soon after childbirth.  
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Part II: Qualitative Analysis 
Part II of this paper explores the influences of neoliberal theory on the 
restructuring of the German welfare state. By doing so, I provide a qualitative analysis of 
Germany’s 2007 parental leave reforms to further support my quantitative conclusions.  I 
particularly focus on Germany’s social democracy and corporatist government model as 
two key components underlying its economic success. Chapter V discusses the 
interrelation between Keynesian doctrines and the modern era of neoliberal economic 
policies to provide a contextual framework. This chapter also includes a discussion of the 
neoliberal principles and policies, and neoliberalism’s effects in advanced industrial 
economies. Chapter V concludes with a brief overview of the critiques and criticisms of 
neoliberal economic theory. Following my discussion of neoliberalism, I offer a snapshot 
of Germany’s social democracy and corporatist government in Chapter VI. This chapter 
considers the contraction of the German welfare state. Finally,Part II concludes, ion 
Chapter VII, with a qualitative assessment of the effects of Germany’s 2007 parental 
policy reforms on its economic competitiveness, politics, and social affairs. This final 
chapter serves as the culmination of my thesis–tying together my quantitative and 
qualitative analysis of Germany’s 2007 parental leave policy reforms.  
For the past forty years, neoliberal economic theories have swept through the 
world like a tidal wave. The emergence of neoliberalism in the mid 1970s transformed 
governments’ attitudes towards international political and economic affairs. Globalization 
acts as a vehicle helping to spread the doctrines of neoliberal economic theory. States 
who wish to compete and survive in our capitalistic international economy must embrace 
some form of neoliberalism.  We have reached a point in which it is difficult for states to 
act alone. Institutional differences in policymaking reflect the complex nature of this 
economic theory. The state is no longer the primary focus in international political 
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economy. With the rise of neoliberalism, government officials have begun to pursue more 
progressive domestic agendas that encourage the independent success of their citizens. In 
this sense, state governments are becoming more concerned with ensuring future 
economic success domestically by laying the necessary groundwork now. Moreover, 
advanced nations are experiencing shifts in the social perceptions of the role government 
should play in people’s lives. Across the board there has been a major shift away from 
“welfarism” towards a neoliberal approach to policy. Meanwhile, the historically social 
democratic states of Europe are striking bargains between their socialist heritage and the 
new values of neoliberalism. The case of Germany is a prime example. The function and 
composition of the German labor force has evolved dramatically since World War II. 
While attempting to rebuild its population and state from the ground up, Germany has 
had to relinquish some of its traditional views on the family unit. The past few decades 
symbolized a dramatic shift away from Germany’s traditional breadwinner model toward 
a dual-earner model of household production.  
The rapidly changing nature of the international system and inception of 
globalization has caused Germany to strike a bargain between old ideas and new 
methods. In this regard, family policy has moved toward the center stage in Germany 
policy agendas. The concept of “parental leave” instead of “maternal leave” is being 
given more respect in their society because of its advantageous effects. By accounting for 
the needs of working mothers and fathers Germany has created a much more diverse 
workforce. In response to neoliberalism’s advance, German policymakers have struck a 
bargain between social conservatism and marketization. The social conservatism 
preserves Germany’s social democratic ideals to support families. Germany’s 
marketization attempts to align individuals’ desires to start families without a heavy 
reliance on welfare. The question that arises here is how has Germany’s social democracy 
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and welfare state come under pressure by virtue of neoliberalism? Furthermore, is 
Germany’s family policy and recent 2007 parental leave reform a result of neoliberal 
pressure? Although Germany has embraced neoliberalism in many aspects, it has also 
preserved its social democratic legacy. Germany’s coalition government has established a 
healthy policy environment for the human capital accumulation, labor market 
productivity, and population growth necessary for it to continue as a leading global 
economy.  
 
V: Neoliberalism  
Neoliberalism in Context and Principle 
Neoliberal economic theory’s dynamism surfaced as response to the intellectual 
divisions within Keynesianism and its failure to adapt to the changing face of the 
international economy in the later half of the 20th century. From the period of the 1930s 
until the mid 1970s, Keynesian economics reigned as the supreme theory. British 
economist John Maynard Keynes emphasized that capitalist economies are subject to 
periodic weakness in aggregate demand generation, which leads to higher unemployment. 
Keynesianism roots itself in a period that was branded by market failures–The Great 
Depression, horrific unemployment, and World War II. The emergence of an 
interventionist state theory occurs in response to major economic crisis because more 
government assistance is necessary to overcome severe crisis. Keynesian economics 
argues that markets may take too long to self-correct and return to a perfect equilibrium–
without high unemployment and little growth. Markets are traditionally defined through 
the absence of state intervention. However, what economists like Keynes fear is that 
markets–when left to their own devices–can be more destructive than government 
intervention. These fears are expected during deflationary time periods where 
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unemployment increases, prices decrease, and demand falls. Keynesianism offered a new 
set of tools for governments to use in attempt to reboot their economies. Monetary and 
fiscal policy tools were developed in the era of Keynesianism. During the Great 
Depression Era, monetary policies were used to adjust interest rates and offset deflation. 
In combination with them, fiscal policies allowed governments to increase spending and 
cut taxes. Altogether these measures were used to generate demand, encourage spending, 
reduce unemployment, and rebuild consumers’ faith in the economy. Keynesianism 
solutions helped rebuild nations in the aftermath of the Great Depression and World War 
II. Ultimately, however, Keynesianism failed because politicians continued to increase 
deficit spending beyond the necessary level.  
The Cold War era opened the doorway for a new economic theory–neoliberalism. 
First and foremost, the challenges governments faced were no longer unilateral. States 
within the international system were introduced to new kinds of threats, primarily 
economic. Moreover, states could no longer confront these challenges unilaterally. The 
entire international system was undergoing rapid economic globalization. For example, 
the creation of international organizations such as the United Nations, World Trade 
Organization, and International Monetary Fund symbolized the new nature of the 
international system. Moreover, there were several economic shocks during the later half 
of the 20th century that changed the relationship between states and the international 
political economy. The 1973 Oil Crisis caused a sharp increase in inflationary prices 
across the global economy, and it especially crippled the economies of advanced western 
nations (Palley, 2004). Moreover, Keynesian policies ultimately proved to be inflationary 
as entitlements grew and fiscal capacities stagnated (Harvey, 1989). The global economic 
crises of the 1970s opened the door for this radically new approach to economic policies. 
Neoliberal policies surfaced in response to the shifts in economic conditions during the 
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1970s and 1980s. The entire face of the international economic affairs was changing. 
Neoliberal theory offered adaptable solutions and tools to address new challenges that 
states faced in international relations.  Yet, it is worth pointing out that, as early as the 
late-1940s, neoliberal economic policies had a powerful champion in the United States, 
which forged greater economic integration globally as a response to the catastrophic 
effects of economic nationalism, in the 1930s, and as a strategic response to Soviet 
communism, one that would draw the “free world” closer together – and to itself, the 
world’s dominant economic power.   
In light of these new international economic pressures, states have come to 
exercise some caution and instrumentalism in their domestic and foreign policy 
approaches. Economic failure at home is now seen as failure abroad, and it is essentially 
recipe for an advanced economy’s downfall as a powerful international actor. Essentially, 
the nation, which offers the best conditions for foreign investment and new business, 
wins the race. A competitive world order has given rise to neoliberal theories, which 
provide states with the tools necessary to thrive. Neoliberalism emphasizes the 
importance of macroeconomic stability (MacLeavy, 2010). Neoliberals view domestic 
economic success from within and without the state. Neoliberalism is a unique political 
economic theory proposing that individual prosperity prospers in an environment where 
fundamental liberties are protected. Individual liberties can only flourish if there are 
strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade (Harvey, 2005). Accordingly, 
the role of the state in neoliberal theory is limited, but not absent. The primary function of 
the neoliberal state is to protect individual freedoms (Harvey, 2005). This strand of 
neoliberalism is taken from Locke’s liberal tradition in international relations. Locke is 
considered one of the founding fathers of liberal theory due to his concern for the 
individual’s “unalienable rights.” Locke argues that people have natural born rights to 
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life, liberty, and property– neoliberalism borrows this mantra. Moreover, the state must 
help in the protection of markets. On that point, markets must be overseen and protected 
by the neoliberal state. Neoliberalism builds upon the ideas of Fredrick von Hayek, who 
critiques an interventionist state (MacLeavey, 2010).  Rather, neoliberal theory governs a 
rolling back of state power and supports the privatization of markets. David Harvey 
interprets this concept as follows:  
Privatization and deregulation combined with competition, it is claimed, 
eliminate bureaucratic red tape, increase efficiency and productivity, improve 
quality, and reduce costs, both directly to the consumer through cheaper 
commodities and services and indirectly through the reduction of the tax burden. 
 
Harvey highlights the quintessential elements of the neoliberal approach– 
deregulation, privatization, and competition. In principle, neoliberal theory is pure 
competition.  
 Furthermore, neoliberals argue for this competition in state’s foreign 
policy approach. That is, the ideal international system for a neoliberal is one 
whereby market forces dictate the expanding global economy. Neoliberal 
economic principles, in international relations, call for the following: 
liberalization of trade policies, open borders and free trade, reduced foreign 
exchange restrictions, and flexible exchange rates. In short, it sees economic 
globalization as fostering national and global economic growth and securing 
human liberty.  International organizations and neoliberalism essentially go hand-
in-hand. Neoliberals adhere to the rules established by these organizations, which 
regard international competition as healthy (Harvey, 2005). Therefore, neoliberals 
advocate for a multilateral reduction in barriers to trade. International competition 
allows for increased productivity, lower prices, and reduced inflationary 
 43 
tendencies (Harvey, 2005). Thus explaining why neoliberalism emerges as the 
solution to the various regional and international inflationary economic crises of 
the 1970s. Moreover, the champion states of neoliberal economic theory pursue 
policies that promote macroeconomic stability.  When domestic competition 
results in economic growth this fosters international competition and growth.  
 
Neoliberal Policies 
By using various legal and economic means, government officials attempt 
to foster an institutional environment within states that promotes and protects 
neoliberalism’s core principles. The primary goal is to establish a legal framework 
that protects individuals’ property rights. The neoliberal state, therefore, should 
“use its monopoly of the means of violence to preserve these freedoms at all 
costs” (Harvey, 2005). In order to protect individual rights, neoliberal policies 
rely upon strong legal jurisdictions. For example, legal patents have been created 
to protect intellectual property rights. Furthermore, globalization has created an 
international system whereby access to information on new technology and 
innovation is within reach of all.  In the advent of globalization, individuals and 
states are more susceptible to infringements of their rights. Neoliberal policies 
hope to avoid these scenarios by enforcing patent laws. The downfall of these 
policy approaches, however, is when “better informed and more powerful” 
players gain a comparative advantage under existing legal frameworks (Harvey, 
2005). Harvey finds fault with the neoliberals’ presumption that competition 
occurs on a level playing field (2005). In reality, not all participants in a market 
have access to equal information. 
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Additionally, supply-side economic devices are used in conjunction with 
legal protections in order to bolster neoliberal principles. What is “supply-side” 
economics? Simply put, supply-side economic policies lower the barriers to 
production and reduce producers’ costs. Essentially, these policies attempt to 
increase consumer’s wellbeing by targeting the supplier directly. Neoliberalism is 
the underlying theory in supply-side economic policies. These policies are 
typically characterized by the following: modest government regulation, 
decreased tax rates, free movement of capital, and free trade. Supply-side 
economics focuses on the importance of macroeconomic stability above all. 
Therefore, neoliberalism stresses that central banks must be independent of 
elected governments. Neoliberal economic policies achieve macroeconomic 
stability by targeting the money supply. The regulation of the money supply to 
affect interest rates and encourage growth is common in neoliberal policies. 
What’s more, neoliberal economic policies largely transfer the power over sectors 
of the economy from public to private hands. In the immediate post WWII period, 
for instance, most of the advanced European powers removed healthcare, 
education, and housing from market forces (Harvey, 2005). With the election, in 
1979, of Margaret Thatcher, a prominent neoliberal politician of the late-20th 
century, however, Britain dramatically marketized its economy. Like the majority 
of OECD nations who followed in her footsteps, Thatcher emphasized public-
private “quasi-governmental” partnerships (Harvey, 2005).  Within neoliberal 
policies, businesses and corporations collaborate with state actors taking part in 
directly influencing the legislative process. Government sold off state economic 
assets like railroads and banks, and shut down underperforming state-owned 
enterprises, such as coalmines. There has been much debate, however, over the 
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actual impact of these neoliberal policies on achieving economic growth in 
Britain and other advanced industrial countries, like the United States, that 
enthusiastically embraced neoliberalism.  
 
Neoliberalism’s Effect in Advanced Industrial Economies 
 The adoption of neoliberal economic policies paved the way for a new era 
of economic cooperation, among advanced industrialized countries (and, later, 
between them and newly emerging market economies). As aforementioned, many 
international organizations sprang up in the wake of World War II to help with 
reconstruction efforts. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development, established in 1948, was one such organization created to help 
finance and implement the United States’ Marshall Plan. For the purpose of this 
paper, I focus my analysis of neoliberalism’s effect in advanced industrial 
economies, primarily on OECD member nations. Since the mid-1997 most all 
OECD countries real effective exchange rates have appreciated as the result of 
massive depreciations in the currencies of emerging markets in Asia (Durand et. 
al, 1998). Neoliberalism’s deregulation of international financial markets and 
floating exchange rates supported these trends. Altogether this has contributed to 
a relative decline in the U.S. competitiveness as a foreign exporter vis-à-vis Asian 
emerging markets between 1995 and 1997 (Durand et. al, 1998). In regards to 
neoliberalism’s effects on foreign direct investment, there was a dramatic increase 
in the cumulative outflows for OECD countries between the 1980s and 1990s. 
This set the stage for the economic success of OECD countries leading into the 
21st century. Within these advanced nations, creditors primarily benefited from the 
rise in interest rates during the late 1970s. One of the major effects of 
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neoliberalism on advanced economies was the increase in wealth of the upper 
fractions of society. The creditors and owners of capital benefited greatly from 
neoliberal policies (Duménil & Lévy, 2005). Moreover, the already advanced 
OECD nations could support more technological innovation and advance the 
spread of their new products. In the advent of neoliberalism we have witnessed 
the birth of multinational corporations (predominantly western) that have created 
monopolies in international trade, to the benefit of advanced economies (Harvey, 
2005). Neoliberalism for citizens within advanced industrial economies has 
created the following advantages: improved productivity, increased consumer 
choice, lower prices, and increased material welfare. Evidently, however, 
neoliberalism creates unequal accumulations of capital and economic growth, 
favoring already advanced economies, which have the wherewithal to compete in 
an international free market system.  
 
Critiques and Criticisms of Neoliberalism 
Neoliberalism has been beneficial for a small handful of elite nations and 
rather detrimental to the majority in our world. One critique to neoliberalism is its 
exacerbation of uneven geographical development and creation of class divisions 
(MacLeavy, 2010). These critics claim that neoliberalism has created an 
international system whereby the interests of economic superpowers trump those 
of lesser-developed nations. Hence why Harvey poses the question: “In whose 
particular interests is it that the state take a neoliberal stance, and in what ways 
have those interests used neoliberalism to benefit themselves rather than, as 
claimed, everyone, everywhere?” (Harvey, 2005) For example, one of the central 
tenants of neoliberal thinking– international competition–has worked to the 
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advantage of advanced nations and, therefore, to the detriment of most developing 
countries. Low income, developing nations rely heavily on protectionist policies 
to support their domestic growth. When neoliberalism arose, the western powers 
had already reached the highest rungs on the ladder of development, while their 
less developed counterparts were still climbing. For those less developed nations, 
free trade meant that their domestic firms would not fare well against international 
firms who had already established a comparative advantage in international 
markets. The result, however, is an increase in unemployment when those 
domestic firms fail to break into international markets. Essentially we have 
witnessed a deliberate creation of unemployment to produce a pool of low-wage 
surplus labor (Harvey, 2005). According to neoclassical economic theories, real 
competition means that those who produce with the lowest costs have the 
comparative advantage. International competition, often times, amounts to a 
cluster of multinational corporations who have monopolized power over smaller 
domestic firms (Harvey, 2005).  
Furthermore, the neoliberal tidal wave in international relations has 
completely restructured pre-existing institutions, powers, and divisions of labor 
and social relations (Harvey, 2005). What does Harvey mean by his term 
“creative destruction,” as a critique of neoliberalism? Following the economic 
crises of the 1970s, the advanced economies (with support from the IMF 
particularly) essentially forced a neoliberal agenda in less developed nations 
around the world, in Latin America especially. The neoliberal agenda has been 
implanted in many developing countries since the 1970s. Behind the economic 
and political mandates was the apparatus that appealed to individual values and 
desires (Harvey, 2005). Western economies utilized their comparative advantages 
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in international markets to create full-fledged neoliberal states across the world. 
Due to the coercive influence of advanced economies, the majority of less 
developed nations were given little choice but to restructure their institutional 
structures according to neoliberal principles. The spread of neoliberalism has 
proved to help develop some nations even faster by opening their borders up to 
trade internationally. It is important, however, to point out that this has not been 
the case across the board. The “creative destruction” has been one of the biggest 
critiques of neoliberalism. Some advanced nations embraced neoliberalism while 
also safeguarding their traditional divisions of labor, social institutions, and 
powers–like Germany. Many European states resisted neoliberal reforms in the 
late 20th century and found ways to preserve their social democratic legacy. Some 
of the advanced social democratic countries avoided the negative effects of 
neoliberalism, i.e. social inequalities, unequal redistribution of wealth, 
unemployment etc. Germany some how managed to embrace neoliberalism while 
maintaining its pre-existing institutions, powers, and divisions of labor and social 
relations.  
 
VI: Germany’s Social Democracy 
Corporatist Model 
The German political economy is largely capitalist but it functions under a social 
democratic umbrella. Germany’s resistance to the negative effects of 
neoliberalism can be attributed to its political culture. German political culture 
strongly encourages collective rights of its citizens. The context of these rights 
however is protected through a corporatist orientation. Germany maintains a 
healthy balance between its corporatist government and competitive marketplace. 
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It does not allow the dominance of one over the other. Corporatism is a “system in 
which the ordinary elements of civil society, such as unions, are sanctioned by the 
state and given authority to represent particular groups” (O’Neil, 2012). 
Germany’s corporatist model includes the voices of business, labor, and the state. 
Altogether, these sectors of its economy work together under established legal 
frameworks to ensure certain political goals are achieved. This model originally 
began in the 1960s when the German government sought to bring together 
business and labor to coordinate economic policy (O’Neil, 2012). By 
implementing such a model of government, Germany has effectively reduced 
conflict between labor and business, which fosters its economic growth. 
Furthermore, Germany’s party structure emphasizes cooperation from parties on 
both ends of the spectrum. Those on the left are guided by social democratic 
principles of the state’s role in the economy, while those on the right are 
influenced by values that favor a free market.  
 
The German Welfare State 
Under the direction of Social Democratic and Christian Democratic governments, 
Germany undertook the reconstruction of its entire state and economy following World 
War II. Germany’s social policies have historically been crafted with influences from the 
Bismarckian legacy (Weishaupt, 2010). The original birth of German state socialism 
occurred in the late 19th century, under the leadership of former German chancellor, Otto 
von Bismarck. This time period signified the introduction of Germany’s social market 
economy whereby Bismarck created German health, accident, old age, and disability 
insurance systems. Out of the chaotic aftermath of WWII came a resurgence of 
Bismarckian socialist tactics. The post-war period proved a challenging time for all 
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nations involved in the conflict, however, Germany bore most of the burden. The political 
and economic atmosphere of the time emphasized the deliverance of public goods 
through the state. The circulation process started from the top and trickled down to reach 
as many peoples as possible. Whether through health, education, insurance, or other 
public goods and services, the German government was dedicated to reenacting its 
welfare state in all arenas. 
The German socialist coalition parties, which dominated the political sphere from 
re-unification into the beginning of the 21st century, effectively expanded the welfare 
state. Following its reunification in 1989, several unexpected coalition governments have 
governed Germany. For the purpose and direction of this paper, however, I begin my 
analysis with the Red-Green coalition, which held power in Germany from 1998 through 
2005. This coalition was composed the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the Green 
Party. The center-left Social Democratic Party– most commonly known as Germany’s 
oldest party–formed in 1875 and found its roots during the 19th  century labor movement. 
The Social Democratic Party represents the interests of the working class citizens. It 
championed support during reunification of East and West Germany in the 1970s. Unlike 
the SPD, which has ruled Germany over various lengths of time, the elections of 1998 
marked the entrance of the Green Party to federal power. The two parties came together 
under the leadership of former Chancellor Gerhard Schröder. As aforementioned, the 
German state, leading up to this point, had been characterized by immense spending to 
support its welfare state and public programs, which enjoyed support from both the center 
left and right of the political spectrum. Schröder entered office on the heels of a financial 
crisis of sorts, which helps to explain the transformation of the German welfare state at 
the turn of the 21st century. 
 
 51 
The Retrenchment of German Welfare State 
During the mid to late 1990s, Germany’s Red-Green coalition attempted to pursue 
an agenda that focused on “modernizing” the welfare state.  Representative of this agenda 
is the Blair-Schröder document of 1999, which embodies the party’s objectives and ideals 
for the future of Europe’s Social-Democratic countries. Then prime minister of the 
United Kingdom, Tony Blair, worked together with Schröder to produce this document. 
In short, the document included constructive criticism of the social systems in place and 
offered new ideologies for reconstruction, which incorporate neoliberal principles. For 
example, Blair and Schröder argued, “The weakness of markets have been overstated and 
their strengths underestimated” (1999).  From a larger prospective, this document 
resembled the ideals of liberal and neo-liberal theories. In their discussion on the role of 
the market Blair and Schröder wrote the following:  
Product market competition and open trade is essential to stimulate productivity 
and growth. For that reason a framework that allows market forces to work 
properly are essential to economic success and a pre-condition of a more 
successful employment policy. 
 
This statement is the prototype of the neo-liberal’s approach to macroeconomic policies, 
which I will address in further detail in the next section. Along the same lines, the authors 
contend that social morality should not be measured using levels of public expenditures 
(Blair & Schröder, 1999). Critics of the Blair-Schröder document remark that it was too 
ideological for the financial situations of Social Democrat governments– specifically 
Germany–at the time.  The expressed goals from this document were not put into 
practice. 
Although the Blair-Schröder document proclaims a reconstruction of the welfare 
state, in reality, the German social system expanded during the Red-Green coalition—
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specifically in relation to family policy. The 2001 parental leave policy strongly 
resembles previous welfarist tactics. Since the policy is means-tested, not income-
dependent, it provides benefits for individuals and families regardless of their previous 
work experience. This particular component of the policy was carried over from the 
previous parental leave policies of the 1990s. Possibly the most explicit example from 
this policy that represents an expansion of the welfare state is the twenty-four month paid 
leave option. By allowing parents on leave twenty-four months of paid leave, the 
government essentially rescinded its goals from the Blair-Schröder document (to do 
what?). This policy’s structure exemplifies a Keynesian welfarist approach to family 
policy. As this paper demonstrates, the 2001 policy discourages a quick return to 
employment following childbirth, relative to the 2007 reform, by financially incentivizing 
the twenty-four month option. According to political economic theory, this policy 
effectively incentivized individuals to delay their return to the workforce, thereby 
generating a “welfare trap” of sorts (MacLeavy, 2010). What does “welfare trap” mean? 
When individuals, in this case usually mothers taking parental leave, become dependent 
upon the benefits they receive from government-funded social programs, they typically 
end up staying out of work for longer periods of time. Drawing from my theoretical 
framework, because longer breaks in employment cause depreciation in human capital, 
individuals find it more difficult to re-enter the labor force.  
Moreover, considering Germany’s record low maternal employment and fertility 
rates, the 2001 policy’s expansion of paid leave time raised even deeper concerns about 
future economic growth. The one saving grace of the 2001 reform is its expansion of the 
allotted time parents on leave are allowed to work while receiving the benefit. The 
previous parental leave policy of 1992 instated that the parent on leave can work only a 
maximum of nineteen part-time hours per-week. Under the 2001 policy, the parent on 
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leave could work a maximum of 30 hours per week while still receiving the benefit. 
Although this is an important policy change, it still only encourages mothers to remain in 
part-time, not full-time, employment. Due to this component, along with its means-tested 
structure, the 2001 policy effectively continued the traditional male breadwinner model 
of household production, which further contributed to a shortage in overall labor force 
participation among females. Also, the policy attempted to encourage fertility; however, 
the benefit amount was significantly lower compared to other OECD nations at the time, 
such as Sweden. Additionally, as Chirakova pointed out, the poor quality, lack of 
availability, and high costs of childcare in Germany have continually deterred females 
from having children (2012). The 2001 policy’s benefit amount was not significant 
enough to outweigh these costs. Finally, the government bore the burden of these costs. 
The 2001 increased total government expenditures on family policy at a time when the 
German economy had already been feeling the competitive effects of economic 
globalization. Overall, the ramifications of this policy on Germany’s future economic 
growth and population development were concerning enough for policymakers to 
completely reconstruct the entire system in 2007. 
 
VII: Evidence of Neoliberalism in Germany’s Family Policy 
The Grand Coalition 
The 2007 parental leave policy reform represents an unexpected paradigm shift in 
the history of Germany’s family policy. Despite its original intentions of modernizing 
and restricting the welfare state, the 2001 parental leave policy nonetheless embraced a 
strong welfarist approach to family policy. As aforementioned, the policy’s central 
components encouraged long breaks in employment for parents taking leave. Moreover, 
the total expenditures to finance the policy seemed contrary to policymakers goals of 
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decreasing public spending. The intentions behind the 2001 policy may have been to 
move away from German welfare state methods, however, the structure did not support 
these goals. At the time of the 2005 elections, political and economic forces were calling 
for different ideological leadership in Germany. Moreover, the atmosphere in German 
politics was less polarized at this time, which encouraged more bipartisan efforts. A 
Grand Coalition government composed of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and 
the Social Democratic Party (SPD) emerged from the elections. Under the leadership of 
Germany’s first ever-female leader, Chancellor Angela Merkel, the country experienced 
serious reconstruction of its political economy. I focus on the retrenchment of Germany’s 
welfare state with the 2007 parental leave policy reform as a case example.  
Under Chancellor Merkel’s leadership, the Grand Coalition represents a major 
shift in German politics. The Christian Democratic Union is Germany’s main, center-
right political party. Its roots can be traced back to Germany’s Center Party in the 1870s, 
which was heavily Catholic and found power in Western Germany (Spiegel Online). This 
fact alone explains why Chancellor Merkel is the most unlikely of CDU candidates. 
Having been born and raised as a Protestant female in East Germany, she is the polar 
opposite of the stereotypical chancellor. Because of her background, Merkel brings 
different experiences and perspectives, which have not played a role historically in the 
highest political office. Her unique leadership style has enabled her to maintain her 
popularity and consistently best other CDU leaders, including those from the CDU’s 
sister party in Bavaria, the more socially conservative and heavily Catholic Christian 
Social Union (CSU). This historic election occurred at a less polarized time, unlike 
during the immediate post WWII and German re-unification periods. The CDU and SDU 
had no option other than to share political power and problem solve together. The CDU 
was able to shift from from its old traditional reliance on the breadwinner model, and the 
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SPD, which had already begun to move toward the center under Schroeder, accepted in 
practice neoliberal solutions to the economic and social challenges facing the German 
state.  The 2007 Parental Leave reform is the product of this political accommodation.  
 
Germany’s 2007 Parental Leave Reform 
Germany’s 2007 parental leave reform marks a shift from the welfarist model 
towards a more consolidated neoliberal approach. With the advent of globalization, 
neoliberal doctrines are becoming more common in domestic and international politics. 
In order to safeguard its economy for future growth and development, Germany’s Grand 
Coalition employed a neoliberal approach to its domestic economic policies. Although 
the welfarist models were supported by both the CDU and SPD, the state of affairs in 
2007 called for a new approach to family policy. Former Chancellor Gerhard Shröder 
claimed in 2005 “Globalization and the economic changes it has caused mean that 
Germany is no longer a country in which there is sufficient room for redistributing 
wealth” (Purvis & Boston, 2005). His remark embodies the surrender of Germany’s 
welfare state to the pressures of globalization. Under the direction of Merkel’s leadership, 
German policymakers enacted policies to activate the labor force and encourage 
competition.  
Take, for example, the qualitative shift that occurred in Germany’s family policies 
in 2001 and 2007. Germany’s 2007 parental leave reform drastically restructured its 
predecessor because of its new neoliberal backbone. Exactly how does Germany’s 2007 
parental leave reform represent an application of neoliberal economic theory? Foremost, 
this reform is predominantly concerned with achieving greater economic efficiency in 
Germany’s family policy, which speaks to the importance that Germany’s political elites 
now give to reducing state spending and pursuing other macro-economic policies that 
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reduce deficit spending and thereby encourage a more favorable investment and 
economic growth climate in Germany. The policy’s benefit and eligibility requirements 
encourage the optimal use of human capital. By replacing the 2001 policy’s two year paid 
leave option the 2007 policy discourages long breaks in employment. Moreover, the new 
policy replaces the old standards of welfarism in Germany’s family policy by 
constructing an earnings-dependent benefit system. It is no longer acceptable for citizens 
to reap the benefits of Germany’s social system without contributing to support its 
sustainability. These policy conditions exemplify the influences from neoliberal 
economic theory. Neoliberal policies replace the “safety net” functions of welfare states 
with new functions as a “trampolines” (MacLeavy, 2010). The 2001 policy still protected 
low-income, non-working citizens within its “safety net.” Its structure was not designed 
to help parents bounce back into employment following childbirth. Rather, parents under 
the 2001 policy were more likely to remain unemployed for longer than necessary and 
potentially fall into the “welfare trap” (MacLeavy, 2010). Whereas, the 2007 policy 
requirements and incentive structure help citizens avoid the “welfare trap” by rebounding 
them back into the German labor market sooner.  
Accordingly, the 2007 parental leave reform aims to achieve greater labor market 
flexibility and competitiveness– two ingredients crucial for Germany to sustain global 
economic austerity.  The Grand Coalition is exactly what Germany needed to rein in 
social spending and place its domestic economy on a path towards supremacy 
internationally. Whether or not Germany was ready for it, the Grand Coalition pursued a 
neoliberal agenda. Driven by long-term macroeconomic success, Chancellor Merkel 
effectively retracted the role of the German government. By trimming costs and cutting 
unnecessary programs, the Grand Coalition created a “leaner, meaner” version of the old 
welfare state (MacLeavy, 2010). The example of Germany’s 2007 Parental Leave reform 
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demonstrates greater austerity measures used by policymakers. German policymakers 
tightened the budget on family policy by making the benefit contingent upon previous 
employment and net earnings. Moreover, this new incentive structure proves to be more 
cost effective and progressive. The policy eradicated the traditional “breadwinner” model 
and replaced it with a dual-earner framework. Furthermore, the policy reform marks a 
significant step in the German government’s advancement of gender equality. In doing 
so, Germany policymakers are showing government support for a more diverse and 
inclusive workforce. 
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Conclusion and Future Research 
 
Germany’s Grand Coalition has successfully implemented a domestic agenda for its 
future economic success as a major global competitor. Germany’s politicians and 
policymakers have learned from the past. The 2007 parental leave policy reforms signify 
Germany’s attempt to end its streak of declining maternal employment and record low 
fertility rates. Moreover, this policy represents the cohesion of ideals from the social left 
with fiscal conservatism of the Christian right. The political consensus in Germany is 
more austere and neoliberal under the Grand Coalition. That is not to say, however, that 
this new era of German governance has forgotten its social democratic values. The policy 
has effectively rid Germany’s population of its reliance on welfare. It promotes 
individual entrepreneurship while supporting individual decisions to start a family. 
The 2007 parental leave reforms, as my quantitative analysis suggests, have been 
effective in encouraging labor market activism amongst mothers. The analysis indicates 
that new mothers are more likely to return to the labor force, and sooner, under the 2007 
policy. The 2007 parental leave reform offers German mothers a healthier work and 
family life balance. Moreover, the reforms buffer Germany’s future workforce by 
encouraging flexibility, diversity, and human capital appreciation. Altogether, this policy 
is crucial if Germany wishes to avoid the future disappearance of its working age 
population. These findings support my claim that Germany’s new approach to family 
policy encourages a healthier future economy, government, and society. In my future 
research I am interested to quantitatively test if this policy has been successful at 
increasing fertility, and examine how childcare availability affects this.  
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